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Cognitive Load Does Not Affect the
Behavioral and Cognitive
Foundations of Social Cooperation
Laura Mieth*, Raoul Bell and Axel Buchner
Department of Experimental Psychology, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social
cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-
looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future
behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners’
cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were
required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators.
A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and
guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that
trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation
than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that
violated the participants’ positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We
were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect—that helps to revise
unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners—depends on cognitive load
induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task
interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-
congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with
and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-
violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding
elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social
cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by
cognitive load.
Keywords: dual task, working memory load, trust, social cooperation, source memory
INTRODUCTION
There is increasing interest in whether (and how) social cooperation is affected by cognitive load.
Although it has been proposed that cooperation is generally decreased (Piovesan and Wengström,
2009) or enhanced (Rand et al., 2012) by cognitive load, no consensus about this issue has been
reached, and there are a number of null findings and failed replications (Tinghög et al., 2013;
Kessler and Meier, 2014; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester, 2014). Focusing on how cognitive load
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affects specific cognitive mechanisms that are important for
cooperation could be a more promising approach than looking
at the global outcome of presumably many different kinds of
processes involved in cooperation. Therefore, the present study
examines how memory for cheating or cooperation—a necessary
prerequisite for reciprocal cooperation (Trivers, 1971)—is
affected by cognitive load. We were particularly interested
in whether or not social expectations affect the participants’
memory for the cheating or cooperation of interaction partners
under cognitive load.
Examining the influence of social expectations seems
particularly important because social cooperation depends
fundamentally on expectations about other people’s behaviors.
This can be illustrated with the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Clark
and Sefton, 2001), which serves as a model for understanding
human cooperation. In this game, two players independently
decide whether or not to cooperate with each other. Mutual
cooperation leads to reward while mutual defection leads to
punishment, which reflects that more can be achieved through
cooperation. However, unilateral defection leads to the highest
payoff (the temptation payoff) while unilateral cooperation leads
to the worst payoff (the sucker’s payoff). The dilemma lies in the
fact that each player can maximize his or her payoff by defecting,
but mutual defection leads to a worse payoff for both players than
mutual cooperation. Humans are often able to resist the selfish
temptation to defect, and high levels of cooperation are often
achieved even in one-shot games (Delton et al., 2011). However,
given that nobody wants to be suckered, cooperation depends on
people’s expectations about whether or not the other player will
choose to cooperate.
These expectations are strongly influenced by facial
appearance (Chang et al., 2010; Olivola and Todorov, 2010).
Appearance-based impressions are formed quickly (Willis
and Todorov, 2006; Todorov et al., 2009) and automatically
(Engell et al., 2007), but are quite stable over time. There is
also a high degree of inter-individual agreement about who
looks trustworthy and who does not (Todorov, 2008). These
appearance-based impressions determine people’s behaviors in
social-dilemma games: People often cooperate with trustworthy-
looking partners, and defect against untrustworthy-looking
partners (van ’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008; Rezlescu et al., 2012).
However, appearance-based expectations may often turn
out to be false. People are somewhat better than chance
when using facial appearance to predict whether partners will
cooperate or cheat in social-dilemma games (Bonnefon et al.,
2013), but facial appearance is a comparatively invalid source
of information about a person’s character, and people rely
on it more than they should (Olivola and Todorov, 2010).
Therefore, remembering expectancy-incongruent information
is especially important to correct invalid appearance-based
impressions about other persons. To correct a false impression,
it is insufficient to simply recognize the face as familiar,
it is also necessary to have good source memory for the
association between the face and the behavior of the person
(Buchner et al., 2009). For example, remembering that a
trustworthy-looking person is unreliable is important to avoid
being misled by the person’s trustworthy appearance in the
future. This functional analysis leads to the prediction that
people should have better source memory for expectancy-
incongruent information than for expectancy-congruent
information.
The same prediction can be derived from schema theories
of memory. The schema-copy-plus-tag model (Graesser and
Nakamura, 1982) implies that expectancy-congruent behaviors
are represented in memory by pointers to general schemas.
Expectancy-violating behaviors are tagged as schema violations.
In memory tests, participants often produce a high amount of
schema-congruent information due to guessing, but memory
accuracy is often poor for this type of information because it
is produced regardless of whether it was present at encoding
or not. The discrimination between actually experienced and
new information is often better for schema-atypical information.
For instance, participants will guess that a trustworthy-looking
face belongs to a trustworthy person, regardless of whether
the behavior of the person was trustworthy or not. Learning
that a trustworthy-looking person is a cheater represents a
more distinct and therefore more memorable information.
Indeed, several studies confirmed the idea that people remember
appearance-incongruent behaviors better than appearance-
congruent behaviors (Suzuki and Suga, 2010; Volstorf et al., 2011;
Bell et al., 2012b).
The present study serves to test whether or not the memory
advantage for expectancy-incongruent behavior depends on
cognitive load. Two opposing hypotheses are tested. Source
memory for cheating and cooperation may be impaired by
cognitive load because source memory is often believed to be
more fragile and more dependent on cognitive resources than
familiarity-based item memory (Nieznan´ski, 2013). Therefore,
the encoding of the association between a face and cheating or
cooperation may be decreased under cognitive load. Memory
for expectancy-incongruent information in particular may
be negatively affected because this information cannot be
easily integrated into existing schemas. Expectancy-incongruent
information may trigger more effortful elaborative encoding than
expectancy-congruent information, which will lead to enhanced
memory for this information under normal circumstances.
However, these elaborative processes may depend on the
mobilization of additional cognitive resources. Therefore, a
reduction in available cognitive resources may eliminate the
expectancy-violation effect. Consistent with this hypothesis,
the source memory advantage for expectancy-incongruent
information was absent in older adults (Bell et al., 2013) who may
have fewer cognitive resources available than younger adults. If
the memory advantage for expectancy-incongruent information
is abolished under cognitive load, our ability to successfully
engage in social cooperation would be impaired because this
type of memory is essential for correcting maladaptive behavior
tendencies.
However, it is also possible that cognitive load has no effect on
memory for expectancy-incongruent behaviors. Remembering
expectancy-incongruent information seems to be too important
to vanish quickly under conditions of high cognitive load.
Cooperation is particularly important in stressful situations. The
human cognitive system would be badly designed if it would
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let go of the most important information under distracting
and stressful conditions first. Therefore, the cognitive machinery
specialized in categorizing other people are often assumed to
be automatic (Klein et al., 2002). The same hypothesis can be
based on non-functional, schema-based accounts of memory.
According to the schema-copy-plus-tag model, schema-atypical
information is encoded and retained in the form of unelaborated
tags. This encoding strategy is assumed to be frugal in terms of
processing resources, and should remain unaffected by cognitive
load (Graesser and Nakamura, 1982). Accordingly, source
memory for the face of a cheater is often not due to an enhanced
recollection of the specific details of the cheating episode, but
instead due to the rough classification of the person as a “cheater”
in form of emotional tagging (Bell et al., 2012a). Arguably, these
unelaborated emotional tags can be automatically encoded even
under conditions of high cognitive load. Consistent with this
idea, a demanding secondary task at encoding does not always
lead to decreased memory for schema-atypical information, but
may even result in a more pronounced schema-atypicality effect
in source memory (Ehrenberg and Klauer, 2005). The automatic
tagging of expectancy-violating behaviors would allow people to
successfully engage in social cooperation even under stressful and
distracting conditions.
The present series of experiments was designed to
discriminate between these two conflicting hypotheses. The
first experiment served to replicate the finding that source
memory for the cheating or cooperation of others is enhanced
for appearance-incongruent behaviors. To anticipate, an
asymmetrical source memory advantage for appearance-
incongruent cheating was found. In two further experiments,
we examined whether this incongruity advantage would vanish
under conditions of increased cognitive load. A fourth study
was designed to validate the cognitive-load task by showing that
this task does indeed interfere with (general) working-memory
resources.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 served as a replication of the effects reported by
Bell et al. (2012b) with the only difference that female instead
of male faces were used as stimuli. We expected to replicate
the finding that people guess that trustworthy-looking faces
would be associated with cooperation and untrustworthy-looking
faces with cheating. Furthermore, we expected that participants
would remember appearance-incongruent behaviors better
than appearance-congruent behaviors. In most experiments
(Suzuki and Suga, 2010; Bell et al., 2012b), this memory
advantage was asymmetric in that participants remembered
cheating better than cooperation when the partners looked
trustworthy, but there was only a non-significant tendency
toward remembering cooperation better than cheating when
the partners looked untrustworthy. This asymmetry should be
particularly pronounced for female faces because they elicit more
positive social expectations than male faces, which means that
the violation of these positive expectations is particularly salient
when female faces are used (Kroneisen and Bell, 2013).
Method
Participants
One hundred and twelve students (73 of whom were female) with
a mean age of 23 (SD= 5) participated in Experiment 1 (Table 1).
All participants gave written informed consent in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki. The present experiments are
part of a series of experiments that has been approved by the
ethics committee of the Department of Experimental Psychology
at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
The same sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game was used as
in previous studies (Bell et al., 2012b, 2013). In this game,
participants were required to invest money into a joint business
with partners whose faces were shown on the screen. Participants
played with 20 trustworthy-looking partners and with 20
untrustworthy-looking partners. The faces were randomly drawn
from a set of 40 trustworthy-looking and 40 untrustworthy-
looking frontal facial photographs of women1 with a neutral
expression (250 × 375 pixel) from the FERET database (Phillips
et al., 1998). In a norming study, the untrustworthy-looking
faces had received low trustworthiness ratings (M = 2.75,
SD = 0.24) and the trustworthy-looking faces had received high
trustworthiness ratings (M = 4.28, SD= 0.23) on a scale ranging
from 1 to 6. Half of the partners in each condition cooperated and
the other half cheated.
Participants could familiarize themselves with the game in
two practice trials. At the start of the game, they were informed
that they played for real money. In each trial, participants first
saw a silhouette at the left side of the screen (representing
the participant), and the partner’s face at the right side of the
screen (Figure 1). Participants were required to decide whether
to invest 15 cents or 30 cents (by pressing a left or right button
of the response box, respectively). The decision was displayed
on screen for 1 s. The investment was presented in an arrow
for 500 ms before it moved to the center of the screen within
500 ms. Similarly, the partner’s decision was shown in an arrow
1As in our previous studies (e.g., Bell et al., 2015) we only used faces from one
gender because it is well known that female faces are more trustworthy than male
faces (Kroneisen and Bell, 2013), and we did not want facial gender to dilute the
facial trustworthiness manipulation.
TABLE 1 | Comparison of age, gender, and justice sensitivity (Schmitt
et al., 2005) of Experiment 1 and 2 and Experiment 1 and 3, respectively.
Age Gender Justice
Sensitivity
Experiment 1 M = 23; SD = 5 female = 73
male = 39
M = 2.93;
SD = 0.60
Experiment 2 M = 24; SD = 5 female = 67
male = 42
M = 2.80;
SD = 0.70
Experiment 3 M = 22; SD = 5 female = 69
male = 34
—
Comparison of
Experiment 1 and 2
t(219) = 1.78,
p = 0.08
χ2 (1) = 0.33,
p = 0.57
t(219) = 1.42,
p = 0.16
Comparison of
Experiment 1 and 3
t(213) = 1.09,
p = 0.28
χ2 (1) = 0.08,
p = 0.78
—
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FIGURE 1 | A screenshot of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. In this example, both the participant and the partner cooperated and invested 30 cents,
resulting in a 10 cents gain for each of them. The partner’s photograph shown in this example was taken from the Center for Vital Longevity (CVL) face database
(Minear and Park, 2004).
for 500 ms, before it moved to the center of the screen within
500 ms. The sum of investments was then shown in the middle of
the screen. After 500 ms a bonus of 1/3 of the sum of investments
was added. After 500 ms, the total sum was shown. After a further
500 ms, this total sum was split up between the partners. Both
the participant and the partner received half of the total sum,
regardless of what they had invested. The partner’s share was
shown in an arrow moving toward the partner’s face (500 ms).
After 500 ms, the participant’s share was shown in an arrow
moving to the participant’s silhouette (500 ms). After 1 s, the
partner’s gain or loss was presented, followed by the participant’s
gain or loss (after 500 ms). After a further 500 ms, the updated
account balance of the participant was presented, and (again after
500 ms) a summary of the interaction was displayed. The next
trial was initiated by the participant pressing the continue button.
A cooperating partner always reciprocated the participant’s
investment (either 15 or 30 cents), which resulted in a gain
for both players. A cheating partner invested nothing (0 cents),
which resulted in a gain for the partner at the expense of the
participant, who lost money.
The payoff (gain or loss) of each player can be determined by
the formula:
Pa =
Ia + Ib + 13 · (Ia + Ib)
2
− Ia
where Pa is the payoff of Player A, Ia is the investment of Player
A, and Ib is the investment of Player B. Applying this formula, it is
obvious that interacting with a cooperating partner led to a gain,
and interacting with a cheating partner led to a loss of the same
magnitude for the participant.
After the game, participants received the instructions for the
surprise source memory test. Eighty faces were presented. Half
of the faces were old (presented during the sequential Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game), and the other half were new. Participants were
first required to rate the likability of the faces on a scale ranging
from 1 (not likable at all) to 6 (very likable). After pressing the
continue button, participants were asked whether or not they
had seen the face during the game. If participants indicated
that they had seen the face before, they were required to decide
whether the face belonged to a cheater or to a cooperator. After
pressing the continue button, the next face was shown. Before
leaving, participants filled out a paper–pencil version of the
justice sensitivity questionnaire (Schmitt et al., 2005), and were
paid.
The design was a 2 × 2 repeated measures design with facial
trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and behavior
(cheating vs. cooperation) as independent variables. Dependent
variables were game investments, likability ratings, and memory
performance. A multinomial model was used to distinguish
among old–new recognition, source memory, and guessing
processes. Given α = 0.05, a sample size of N = 112, and 80
responses in the source memory test, it was possible to detect an
effect of size w = 0.04 (comparable to the effect sizes observed
by Buchner et al., 2009; Küppers and Bayen, 2014; Bell et al.,
2015; Kroneisen et al., 2015) for the comparison between source
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memory for cheaters and cooperators with a statistical power
(1 – β) of 0.97. The power calculation was performed using
G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007).
Measuring Source Memory
When examining source memory, it is important to use a measure
that does not confound item recognition, source memory, and
guessing (Bröder and Meiser, 2007). Therefore, we applied the
widely used (Erdfelder et al., 2009) source monitoring model
of Bayen et al. (1996) to measure source memory and source
guessing separately.
To illustrate, the first model tree in Figure 2 represents the
cognitive states that are assumed to underlie the classification of
a cheater face. With probability DCheat, participants know that
the face is old (remember that they have seen the face during
the game). With probability dCheat, they also have source memory
for the face (remember that the person is a cheater). The source
memory parameter is expressed as a conditional probability that
varies between 0 and 1. A probability of 0 represents the absence
of source memory while a probability of 1 represents perfect
source memory. If participants fail to remember the source,
FIGURE 2 | The multinomial source memory model adapted from
Bayen et al. (1996). Rounded rectangles on the left represent the items
presented in the source memory test (cheater, cooperator, or new faces). The
letters along the branches represent the probabilities with which certain
memory states occur (D: probability to correctly recognize a face as old or
new; d: conditional probability to correctly remember that the person was a
cheater or a cooperator; g: conditional probability to guess that the person
was a cheater; b: conditional probability to guess that a face was old).
Rectangles on the right represent the participants’ responses in the memory
test.
which occurs with the complementary probability 1 – dCheat,
they may guess, with probability g, that the person was a cheater
or, with probability 1 – g, that the person was a cooperator.
If they fail to recognize the face as old, which occurs with
probability 1 – DCheat , they may guess, with probability b, that
the face is old, and may then guess that the person was a cheater
with probability g, or that the person was a cooperator with
probability 1 – g. With probability 1 – b, participants may guess
that the face is new (has not been encountered during the game).
The goodness-of-fit tests are based on the log-likelihood ratio
statistic G2 which is asymptotically chi-square distributed (Riefer
and Batchelder, 1988; Stahl and Klauer, 2007; Singmann and
Kellen, 2013). Parameter estimations and goodness-of-fit tests
were calculated using multiTree (Moshagen, 2010). The observed
response frequencies for Experiments 1–3 are reported in the
Online Supplementary Material (Data Sheets 1–3).
Results
Game Investments
Game investments were analyzed with a repeated measures
MANOVA with facial trustworthiness (trustworthy-looking vs.
untrustworthy-looking) as independent variable. Participants
only interacted once with each partner and thus had no chance
to anticipate the behavior of the partners before they decided
whether to invest or not. Therefore, only the partners’ facial
trustworthiness, but not their behavior could influence the
investments. As expected, participants invested more money
when playing with trustworthy-looking partners than when
playing with untrustworthy-looking partners, F(1,111)= 136.83,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.55 (see left panel of Figure 3).
Likability Ratings
Likability ratings were analyzed with a 2 × 2 MANOVA with
facial trustworthiness (trustworthy-looking vs. untrustworthy-
looking) and partner behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) as
independent variables. Trustworthy-looking faces were more
likable than untrustworthy-looking faces, F(1,111) = 410.29,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.79. Cooperators received higher likability
ratings than cheaters, F(1,111) = 12.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.10.
There was no interaction between facial trustworthiness and
behavior, F(1,111) = 1.75, p = 0.189, η2p = 0.01 (see left panel
of Figure 4).
Old–New Recognition
Old–new recognition in terms of Pr (the sensitivity measure
of the two-high-threshold model of old–new recognition, often
referred to as corrected hit rate and given by hit rate minus false
alarm rate; Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988) is shown in the left
panel of Figure 5. A 2 × 2 MANOVA was performed with facial
trustworthiness (trustworthy-looking vs. untrustworthy-looking)
and partner behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) as independent
variables. There was no main effect of facial trustworthiness on
face recognition, F(1,111) = 0.52, p = 0.472, η2p < 0.01, no main
effect of partner behavior, F(1,111) = 1.11, p = 0.294, η2p = 0.01,
and no interaction between facial trustworthiness and behavior,
F(1,111)= 0.90, p= 0.346, η2p < 0.01.
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FIGURE 3 | Participants’ mean investments in the social interaction game as a function of facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) in
Experiment 1 (without cognitive load) and in Experiments 2 and 3 (with cognitive load). The error bars represent the standard errors.
FIGURE 4 | Mean test-phase likability ratings (on a scale ranging from 1 to 6) as a function of facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy)
and behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) in Experiment 1 (without cognitive load) and in Experiments 2 and 3 (with cognitive load). The error bars
represent the standard errors.
Source Guessing and Source Memory
To disentangle source guessing and memory, the multinomial
source monitoring model mentioned above (Bayen et al., 1996)
was used. For the present study, we needed two sets of the trees
displayed in Figure 2, one for trustworthy faces and one for
untrustworthy faces. To obtain an identifiable base model, we
assumed that old–new recognition does not differ as a function
of partner behavior (as evidenced by the analysis of old–new
recognition reported above), and does not differ between old
and new faces (DCheat = DCoop = DNew), which is commonly
assumed when using the two high threshold model (Snodgrass
and Corwin, 1988; Bayen et al., 1996). This base model fit the data
well, G2(2)= 1.84, p= 0.398.
First, we analyzed whether participants would show an
expectancy-congruent guessing bias. When the behavior of
a recognized person is not remembered, participants have
to guess whether the face was associated with cheating
or cooperation. In previous studies (Bell et al., 2012b),
participants guessed that trustworthy-looking persons were
cooperators and that untrustworthy-looking persons were
cheaters. That pattern was replicated here. If source memory
was not available at test, participants showed a strong bias
toward guessing that trustworthy-looking faces were previously
associated with cooperation and that untrustworthy-looking
faces were previously associated with cheating, 1G2(1) = 43.01,
p < 0.001, w= 0.07 (see left panel of Figure 6).
The left panel of Figure 7 displays the estimates for source
memory parameter d representing the conditional probability of
remembering the behaviors of cheaters and cooperators given
that their faces were recognized as old. Source memory was
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FIGURE 5 | Old–new recognition in terms of Pr (corrected hit rates) as a function of facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and partner
behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) in Experiment 1 (without cognitive load) and in Experiments 2 and 3 (with cognitive load). The error bars represent
the standard errors.
FIGURE 6 | Estimates of the guessing parameter g representing the probability to guess that a person was a cheater rather than a cooperator as a
function of facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) in Experiment 1 (without cognitive load) and in Experiments 2 and 3 (with cognitive
load). The error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals.
better for cheaters than for cooperators when the faces looked
trustworthy,1G2(1)= 4.82, p= 0.028, w= 0.02, but there was no
corresponding memory advantage for cooperators over cheaters
when the faces looked untrustworthy, 1G2(1) = 0.14, p = 0.704,
w < 0.01. Thus, we replicated the finding of an asymmetrical
expectancy-violation effect (Suzuki and Suga, 2010; Bell et al.,
2012b).
Discussion
In Experiment 1, as in previous studies (van ’t Wout and
Sanfey, 2008; Bell et al., 2012b, 2013), participants invested more
money into the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (trusted
their partners more) when the partners looked trustworthy than
when they looked untrustworthy. In the memory test, old–
new recognition was not affected by facial trustworthiness and
partner behavior, consistent with a large number of previous
studies showing that a person’s behavior has no effect on old–
new face recognition (e.g., Barclay and Lalumière, 2006; Mehl and
Buchner, 2008; Buchner et al., 2009; Kroneisen and Bell, 2013).
There are some reports suggesting that old–new recognition is
better for untrustworthy-looking than for trustworthy-looking
persons (Rule et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2013; Mattarozzi et al., 2015),
but this finding was not reliably obtained across experiments
(Bell et al., 2012b), and was not replicated here. Consistent
with several other studies (Nash et al., 2010; Bell et al., 2012b;
Cassidy et al., 2012), participants demonstrated a bias toward
guessing that trustworthy-looking persons were cooperators
and untrustworthy-looking persons were cheaters. Moreover,
and in line with previous studies (Suzuki and Suga, 2010;
Bell et al., 2012b), an asymmetric source memory advantage
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FIGURE 7 | Estimates of the source memory parameter d as a function of the partners’ facial trustworthiness (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and the
partners’ behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) in Experiment 1 (without cognitive load) and in Experiments 2 and 3 (with cognitive load). The error bars
represent the 95% confidence intervals.
for appearance-incongruent negative information was found:
Participants had better source memory for trustworthy-looking
cheaters than for trustworthy-looking cooperators.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 served to test whether a different pattern of results
would be obtained under cognitive load. To impose cognitive
load, a continuous choice reaction time (CRT) task with auditory
stimuli was used as secondary task. This is a well established
method to impose cognitive load (Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2003;
Kroneisen et al., 2014), and has the advantage that it involves
non-verbal stimuli and responses that do not directly interfere
with the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Participants had
to classify three randomly varying tones by pressing three buttons
on a response box. The tones were continuously presented to
guarantee a steady burden on cognitive resources. The main
question was whether the expectancy-violation effect on source
memory would disappear under conditions of reduced cognitive
resources.
Method
Participants
One hundred and nine students (67 of whom were female)
with a mean age of 24 (SD = 5) participated in Experiment 2.
Participants in Experiment 2 did not differ from those in
Experiment 1 in terms of age, gender, and justice sensitivity
(Table 1). All participants gave written informed consent.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that
participants were required to perform a secondary CRT task
during the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. The task was
to continuously classify three piano tones (C1, F3, and B6) by
pressing a black left, gray middle, or white right button on a
response box, respectively. Each tone was repeated once every
second until participants made a CRT response by pressing
a CRT button. Participants received no reminder of the CRT
task and no explicit warning when they failed to respond to
the CRT stimuli (but the repeated presentation of the same
tone can be seen as an implicit warning). Before the start of
the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, participants received
a training of the CRT task. During this training, participants
received immediate feedback about their responses (“correct” in
green font color or “false” or “miss” in red font color). This
training continued until participants had 20 correct responses in
a row.
Given that participants were not pressured to perform the
secondary CRT task, it was necessary to exclude participants who
did not respond to the CRT stimuli properly. As an inclusion
criterion, we required a minimum of one response per trial in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on average. Based on this criterion,
datasets of 13 participants were excluded from analyses because
of too few CRT responses. With the remaining sample consisting
of 96 participants, it was possible to detect an effect of size
w= 0.04 for the comparison of source memory between cheaters
and cooperators with a statistical power (1 – β) of 0.94.
Results
Game Investments
As in Experiment 1, participants invested more when playing
with trustworthy-looking partners than when playing with
untrustworthy-looking partners, F(1,95) = 160.64, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.63 (see middle panel of Figure 3).
Likability Ratings
There was a main effect of facial trustworthiness on likability,
F(1,95) = 433.80, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.82. The effect of partner
behavior was not significant, F(1,95)= 1.13, p= 0.290, η2p = 0.01.
There was no interaction between facial trustworthiness and
behavior, F(1,95) = 0.07, p = 0.794, η2p < 0.01 (see middle panel
of Figure 4).
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Old–New Recognition
Old–new recognition was lower than in Experiment 1, but
the same pattern of results was obtained (see middle panel
of Figure 5). There was neither a main effect of facial
trustworthiness, F(1,95)= 0.34, p= 0.563, η2p < 0.01, nor a main
effect of partner behavior, F(1,95) = 0.02, p = 0.897, η2p < 0.01.
The two-way interaction was not significant, F(1,95) = 0.34,
p= 0.562, η2p < 0.01.
Source Guessing and Source Memory
The base model fit the data well, G2(2) = 0.32, p = 0.852. As
in Experiment 1, participants were more likely to guess that
untrustworthy-looking faces were associated with cheating than
that trustworthy-looking faces were associated with cheating,
1G2(1) = 48.32, p < 0.001, w = 0.08 (see middle panel of
Figure 6).
Again, source memory was better for cheating than for
cooperation when the faces looked trustworthy, 1G2(1) = 5.22,
p = 0.022, w = 0.03, and source memory did not differ between
cheating and cooperation when the faces looked untrustworthy,
1G2(1) = 0.67, p = 0.414, w < 0.01 (see middle panel of
Figure 7).
Performance in the Continuous Reaction Time Task
The description of the results is incomplete without an
analysis of the performance in the CRT task because it is
important to test whether or not the enhanced memory for
appearance-incongruent cheating is due to a performance trade-
off between the encoding of the faces and the CRT task.
Therefore, we performed two 2 × 2 MANOVAs with the
partner trustworthiness (trustworthy-looking vs. untrustworthy-
looking) and partner behavior (cheating vs. cooperation) as
independent variables and the proportion of correct responses
and the response times (including only correct responses that
occurred after > 100 ms) in the CRT task as dependent variables
(Table 2). Proportion correct did not differ as a function of facial
trustworthiness, F(1,95) = 2.43, p = 0.122, η2p = 0.02. However,
CRT performance was less accurate in the cheater condition
in comparison to the cooperator condition, F(1,95) = 5.76,
p = 0.018, η2p = 0.06. There was no interaction between facial
trustworthiness and partner behavior, F(1,95) = 0.14, p = 0.704,
η2p < 0.01. Response times showed a similar pattern. Response
time did not differ as a function of facial trustworthiness,
F(1,95) = 0.31, p = 0.578, η2p < 0.01. Responses were slower in
the cheater condition in comparison to the cooperator condition,
F(1,95) = 5.09, p = 0.026, η2p = 0.05. However, there was no
interaction between facial trustworthiness and partner behavior,
F(1,95) = 0.15, p = 0.697, η2p < 0.01. Given that this attentional
disruption did not translate into better memory for cheaters
(as shown by the analyses above), this result does not seem
to reflect a reallocation of cognitive resources to the cheater
faces and, therefore, does not seem to reflect a performance
trade-off between the memory task and the CRT task. It seems
possible to speculate that experiencing cheating may result
in a negative emotional response that may distract from the
secondary task, but does not seem to cause a direct memory
enhancement.
TABLE 2 | Mean proportion correct and response times in milliseconds in
the CRT task as a function of the partners’ facial trustworthiness
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and the partners’ behavior (cheating vs.
cooperation) in Experiments 2 and 3.
Cheating Cooperation
M SE M SE
Experiment 2
Proportion correct
Trustworthy Faces 0.90 0.01 0.92 0.01
Untrustworthy Faces 0.91 0.01 0.92 0.01
Response time
Trustworthy Faces 2,252 79 2,186 86
Untrustworthy Faces 2,240 99 2,149 86
Experiment 3
Proportion correct
Trustworthy Faces 0.88 0.01 0.90 0.01
Untrustworthy Faces 0.89 0.01 0.90 0.01
Response time
Trustworthy Faces 788 13 762 13
Untrustworthy Faces 787 12 760 13
Discussion
Even though participants had to perform a secondary CRT task,
the results were almost identical to those of Experiment 1. Most
importantly, participants showed evidence of an appearance-
congruent guessing bias and of an asymmetrical expectancy-
violation effect on source memory. We conclude from these
findings that the enhanced memory for expectancy-incongruent
information is obtained even under conditions of cognitive
load, which suggests that the encoding of this information
occurs automatically and does not rely on demanding elaborative
processes.
It seemed important to address the possible concern that
the CRT task may simply not have been demanding enough to
interfere with the primary task. In Experiment 2, participants
were required to perform the secondary CRT task concurrently to
the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, but no time pressure was imposed.
Therefore, it may have been possible to attend to both the CRT
task and the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game by delaying responses in
the CRT task. In Experiment 3, we therefore required participants
to respond to each tone within a time interval of 2 s (which is a
typical time interval in CRT studies, see Kroneisen et al., 2014).
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 with the exception
that the CRT task was modified to increase the continuous
demands on cognitive resources.
Method
Participants
One hundred three students (69 of whom were female) with a
mean age of 22 (SD = 5) participated in Experiment 3. The
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sample was similar to those in Experiments 1 and 2 (Table 1).
All participants gave written informed consent.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 with the exception
that the CRT task required participants to respond to each tone
within 2 s, after which the next tone was presented. If participants
failed to respond to a tone during a trial of the sequential
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, they received a warning after the trial
that reminded them of the CRT task. In contrast to Experiment
2—in which the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game was self-
paced—the next round of the game was automatically initiated
10 s after the summary of the interaction had been displayed.
Justice sensitivity was not assessed.
The data of two outliers were excluded from the analyses
because these participants produced >20% CRT misses on
average. The remaining sample responded to 98% of the
CRT stimuli on average. With a remaining sample of 101
participants, it was possible to detect an effect of size w = 0.04
for the comparison between source memory for cheaters and
cooperators with a statistical power (1 – β) of 0.95.
Results
Game Investments
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants invested more
when playing with trustworthy-looking partners than when
playing with untrustworthy-looking partners, F(1,100)= 157.95,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.61 (see right panel of Figure 3).
Likability Ratings
There was a main effect of facial trustworthiness on likability
with higher likability ratings for trustworthy-looking compared
to untrustworthy-looking partners, F(1,100)= 504.95, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.83. Cheaters were judged to be less likable than
cooperators, F(1,100) = 15.08, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.13. The
interaction between facial trustworthiness and behavior was not
significant, F(1,100)= 0.05, p= 0.822, η2p < 0.01 (see right panel
of Figure 4).
Old–New Recognition
There was neither a main effect of facial trustworthiness on old–
new recognition, F(1,100) = 1.49, p = 0.225, η2p = 0.01, nor
a main effect of partner behavior, F(1,100) = 0.21, p = 0.651,
η2p < 0.01. The two-way interaction was also not significant,
F(1,100)= 0.57, p= 0.452, η2p < 0.01 (see right panel of Figure 5).
Source Guessing and Source Memory
The base model fit the data well, G2(2) = 0.87, p = 0.647. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were significantly more likely
to guess that untrustworthy-looking faces were associated with
cheating than that trustworthy-looking faces were associated with
cheating,1G2(1)= 55.78, p< 0.001, w= 0.08 (see right panel of
Figure 6).
As in the previous experiments, there was a source memory
advantage for cheaters over cooperators when the faces looked
trustworthy, 1G2(1) = 12.60, p < 0.001, w = 0.04, but source
memory did not differ between cheaters and cooperators when
the faces looked untrustworthy, 1G2(1) = 0.42, p = 0.519,
w < 0.01 (see right panel of Figure 7).
Performance in the Continuous Reaction Time Task
As in Experiment 2 we performed analyses of the proportion
of correct responses and response times (including only correct
responses that occurred after >100 ms) in the CRT task. CRT
responses were faster than they were in Experiment 2, but the
same pattern of results was observed (Table 2). Proportion
correct did not differ as a function of facial trustworthiness,
F(1,100)= 0.42, p= 0.520, η2p < 0.01. CRT performance was less
accurate in the cheater condition in comparison to the cooperator
condition, F(1,100) = 21.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18. There was no
interaction between facial trustworthiness and partner behavior,
F(1,100) = 0.55, p = 0.460, η2p < 0.01. Response times showed a
similar pattern. Response time did not differ as a function of facial
trustworthiness, F(1,100)= 0.09, p= 0.764, η2p < 0.01. However,
responses were slower in the cheater condition in comparison to
the cooperator condition, F(1,100)= 33.29, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.25.
There was no interaction between facial trustworthiness and
partner behavior, F(1,100) = 0.04, p = 0.845, η2p < 0.01. Again,
the previous analyses suggest that this attentional disruption is
not associated with enhanced encoding of the cheater faces.
Discussion
Even though participants were pressured to make faster responses
in the CRT task, the same pattern of results was obtained
as in Experiments 1 and 2. Most importantly, we obtained
evidence in favor of an expectancy-congruent guessing bias
and of an asymmetric expectancy-violation effect. Therefore, it
seems possible to conclude that the encoding of expectancy-
incongruent information works well even under conditions of
high cognitive load, presumably because it occurs automatically.
At a descriptive level, the results of all three experiments
are strikingly similar with the only exception that old–new
recognition seems to be somewhat decreased in Experiments 2
and 3 in comparison to Experiment 1.
Given that the CRT task did not seem to have any substantial
effect on source memory (or any other variable except face
recognition), it may be tempting to conclude from these findings
that the CRT task was simply not demanding enough. However,
concluding from a non-significant finding that the cognitive load
manipulation was not strong enough is problematic because this
type of circular reasoning renders the prediction that cognitive
load affects cooperation and memory unfalsifiable. To escape
this problem, we performed a validation study to test whether
the secondary task does indeed disrupt cognitively demanding
working-memory processes (as intended).
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 served to validate the CRT task by testing whether
it does indeed have the capacity to disrupt cognitively demanding
processes. We used both a verbal memory task and a spatial
memory task to test whether the CRT task interferes generally
with cognitive processing and does not only selectively affect the
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processing of a specific type of information (Lange, 2005; Vachon
et al., in press).
Method
Participants
Forty students (27 of whom were female) with a mean age of
24 (SD = 4) participated in Experiment 4. Participants were
consecutively assigned to either the cognitive load group or the
control group (i.e., Participant 1 was assigned to the cognitive
load condition, Participant 2 was assigned to the control
condition, and so on). All participants gave written informed
consent.
Materials, Procedure, and Design
Participants performed a verbal working memory task and a
spatial working memory task. Task order was counterbalanced
between groups (cognitive load vs. control).
In the verbal working memory task, participants were required
to remember sequences with varying sequence lengths of four to
nine items. The items were randomly drawn from the set {1, 2,
. . . 9}. Each trial started with a visual warning that participants
were required to remember the digits. The digits were presented
one after another in 24 pt Arial font at the center of a computer
screen for 800 ms with a 200 ms inter-stimulus interval. After
a retention interval of 2 s, a number pad with the previously
presented digits was shown, and participants were required to
select the numbers in the correct (forward) order, using the
computer mouse. Selected digits were grayed out, and could not
be selected again. After all digits were selected, the number pad
disappeared, and a continue button was shown. Upon clicking
this button, the next trial started. The task started with a sequence
length of four digits. Digit length gradually increased during the
task. Participants completed three trials of each sequence length.
The spatial working memory task was identical to the verbal
working memory task except that participants were required to
remember the spatial locations of four to nine black dots instead
of four to nine digits. The locations of the dots were not aligned
(but instead randomly distributed across the screen) to make
a verbal coding strategy extremely difficult. In each trial, the
spatial positions were randomly drawn from a set of nine different
spatial positions. The dots appeared one after another at their
designated positions (800 ms on, 200 ms off). After a retention
interval of 2 s, the previously presented dots were presented again
at their corresponding spatial locations. The participants’ task
was to select the spatial locations of the dots in the order of their
appearance. Selected locations were grayed out, and could not be
selected again.
The working memory tasks were either completed alongside
the secondary CRT task (in the cognitive load condition) or
without the secondary CRT task (in the control condition).
The CRT task was identical to the one used in Experiment 3.
Participants were reminded of the tone classification task before
each trial. Tones were presented only during visual item
presentation and the retention interval of the working memory
task, but not during recall. If participants did not give a response
to all CRT tones, they received a warning when the recall of the
items was completed.
The design was a mixed 2 × 2 design with working memory
task (verbal vs. spatial) as a within-subject variable and cognitive
load (cognitive load vs. control) as a between-subjects variable.
The dependent variable was working memory performance
according to a strict scoring criterion (only items remembered
in their correct serial position were scored as correct). Given
α = 0.05, a total sample size of N = 40 participants, and an
assumed correlation between the levels of the within-subject
variable of ρ = 0.50, an effect of size f = 0.50 could be detected
for the cognitive load variable with a statistical power (1 – β)
of 0.95.
Results
A 2× 2 MANOVA with cognitive load (cognitive load vs. control)
and working memory task (verbal vs. spatial) as independent
variables yielded a main effect of cognitive load, F(1,38) = 20.60,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35, and of task, F(1,38) = 70.34, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.65, but no interaction between cognitive load and task,
F(1,38)= 1.75, p= 0.193, η2p = 0.04. Cognitive load significantly
decreased memory performance both in the verbal, t(38) = 3.68,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.26, and in the spatial task, t(38) = 4.05,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.30 (Figure 8). Raw data are reported in the
Online Supplementary Material (Data Sheet 4).
Discussion
Experiment 4 serves as a validation study to confirm that the CRT
task interferes with cognitively demanding processes. In line with
our expectations, the CRT task disrupted performance in a verbal
working memory task as well as in a spatial working memory task,
suggesting that it does not only interfere with a specific type of
information processing, but instead leads to a general decrease
of cognitive resources. This rules out the possibility that the CRT
FIGURE 8 | Mean working memory performance in proportion correct
as a function of working memory task (verbal vs. spatial) and cognitive
load (cognitive load vs. control). The error bars represent the standard
errors.
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task was not demanding enough to disrupt cognitive processing,
which facilitates the interpretation of the findings obtained in
Experiments 1–3.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous research suggests that expectations about other people’s
trustworthiness are formed quickly and automatically on the
basis of physical appearance (Todorov et al., 2009, 2015).
Trustworthiness judgments in particular are strongly affected
by facial cues (Todorov, 2008). The assumption that facial
cues have a strong effect on trust and social expectations
(van ’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008) is further confirmed by
the present results. Specifically, participants invested more
into the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game when the
partners looked trustworthy than when the partners looked
untrustworthy. Given that investing into the game only payed
off when the partner reciprocated, this result suggests that
trustworthy-looking partners were expected to cooperate more
than untrustworthy-looking partners. Noticeably, this pattern of
results was obtained without and with cognitive load, which
confirms previous findings suggesting that the perception of
facial trustworthiness is an automatic process that does not
depend on the availability of cognitive resources (Bonnefon et al.,
2013).
Given that appearance-based judgments about a person
are often invalid (Todorov et al., 2015), it is important to
update facial trustworthiness judgments with behavioral
information (Rezlescu et al., 2012). It may be especially
important to remember expectancy-incongruent behaviors
to be able to correct a false first impression about another
person. Consistent with previous studies (Suzuki and Suga, 2010;
Volstorf et al., 2011; Bell et al., 2012b), source memory was
better for the appearance-incongruent cheating of a trustworthy-
looking person in comparison to the appearance-congruent
cooperation of a trustworthy-looking person. Noticeably,
memory for appearance-congruent cooperation was poor.
This confirms the predictions of the schema-copy-plus-tag
model (Graesser and Nakamura, 1982), which states that
discriminability of schema-consistent information is poor
because it will be produced at test regardless of whether it was
presented at encoding or not. Schema-atypical information is
more distinct, and, therefore, associated with better memory
discriminability.
Memory was selectively enhanced for cheating that violated
a positive expectation about a trustworthy-looking partner,
but there was no similar memory advantage for cooperators
over cheaters when the faces looked untrustworthy. This
asymmetry was also found in previous memory experiments
(Suzuki and Suga, 2010; Bell and Buchner, 2012), and it fits
with a study on investments in repeated game interactions
showing that participants tend to adjust their own behavior
more strongly in response to a partner’s defection than in
response to a partner’s cooperation (Chang et al., 2010).
This asymmetric memory advantage for appearance-incongruent
cheating over appearance-incongruent cooperation may be
particularly pronounced in the present study because only female
stimulus faces were used. It is known that female faces tend
to elicit positive social expectations (Kroneisen and Bell, 2013),
which means that norm-violating behaviors of female partners
may represent particularly strong expectancy violations (Bell
et al., 2015).
Two explanations for the memory advantage for appearance-
incongruent cheating were tested. According to the first account,
information that does not fit into existing schemas receives
more elaborative processing, which depends on the mobilization
and availability of additional cognitive resources. This enhanced
elaboration results in a more vivid and detailed recollection
of the expectancy-incongruent information. According to the
second account, schema-atypical information is retained in
form of unelaborated tags. This resource-efficient encoding
strategy has the advantage that unexpected information can
be encoded and retained in memory even under conditions
of high cognitive load. The present results support the latter
view. The source memory advantage for appearance-incongruent
cheating was not affected by the presence or absence of cognitive
load at encoding. A similar memory advantage for appearance-
incongruent cheating was obtained in all three experiments,
regardless of whether participants had to perform a demanding
secondary task at encoding or not. The experiments were
reported separately because they were run at different times.
However, when the source memory data of all experiments
were combined in a single supplementary cross-experimental
analysis, the conclusion that source memory was not affected
by cognitive load was supported. The base model still fit the
data well, G2(6) = 3.02, p = 0.807. Source memory did not
differ among experiments, 1G2(8) = 11.95, p = 0.154, w = 0.02,
which suggests that the pattern of results was not affected by the
secondary task in Experiments 2 and 3.
This pattern of findings confirms the predictions of the
schema-copy-plus-tag model (Graesser and Nakamura, 1982),
according to which schema-violating information is retained in
the form of simple tags that require only minimal elaboration,
and can therefore be encoded and retained even under conditions
of high cognitive load. Consistent with this interpretation, it has
been previously shown that the source memory advantage for
faces of cheaters is not due to a vivid recollection of the cheating
episode, but rather due to emotional tagging in the sense of
a rough classification of the partner as a “cheater” (Bell et al.,
2012a). The encoding and retrieval of simple emotional tags may
be less cognitively demanding and, therefore, less affected by
a reduction in cognitive resources than other types of context
memory (Rahhal et al., 2002).
This interpretation fits well with Todorov and Uleman’s (2003)
assumption that reading about or observing the behavior of
another person leads people to draw inferences about the other
person’s traits (e.g., dishonest or honest) that then become linked
to the other person’s face. Importantly, these trait representations
are assumed to include only a summary judgment about the other
person’s behavior, and to be comparatively unelaborated and
robust (Carlston and Skowronski, 1994; Todorov and Uleman,
2002). In the study of Todorov and Uleman (2003), participants
saw faces with behavior descriptions that implied character traits.
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The binding between faces and traits was revealed by an enhanced
false recognition of the trait labels in an implicit memory
test. The most interesting finding in the present context is
that the implicit memory for the association between a face
and a trait was not affected by a secondary task at encoding
(rehearsing 6-digit numbers), which suggests that the process
of binding traits to faces is an automatic process. The present
study shows parallel findings in a different paradigm where
traits are directly inferred from experiences in a social-dilemma
game, and memory is tested in an explicit source memory
test.
Remembering appearance-congruent cooperation and
cheating enables participants to update their impressions about
other people, which could have beneficial effects on future social
decision making. For instance, when we encounter a trustworthy-
looking person, but learn subsequently that this person is
not to be trusted, memory for the appearance-incongruent
cheating may help to avoid being fooled by the trustworthy
appearance of this person again. Obviously, this discussion
implies that the memory for the partners’ previous behaviors is
used to inform social decision making. Previous results using
repeated social-dilemma games suggest that people continue
to rely on facial trustworthiness over the course of the game
(in line with the persistent effect of facial trustworthiness on
source guessing in the present experiment), but also succeed in
adjusting their own decisions to the individual partners’ previous
trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviors (Chang et al., 2010;
Rezlescu et al., 2012). Murty et al. (2016) directly examined the
relationship between memory and economic decision making,
and found that source memory (in contrast to item memory)
had a beneficial effect on the participants’ choices in social and
non-social decision making tasks. Therefore, it seems plausible
to assume that source memory for appearance-incongruent
behaviors can have direct beneficial effects on social decision
making.
CONCLUSION
In sum, source memory for cheaters and cooperators was
highly similar across experiments, regardless of whether cognitive
load was induced at encoding (Experiments 2 and 3) or not
(Experiment 1). These results are compatible with the general
idea that cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation
operate highly automatically so that they remain unaffected by
cognitive load. Specifically, it seems possible to encode and retain
information about a person’s expectancy-incongruent behavior
even under conditions of high cognitive load. Remembering this
type of behavior seems particularly important for the decision
making process because it helps to correct maladaptive behavior
tendencies. For example, it seems particularly important to
remember that a trustworthy-looking person is in fact not to be
trusted to avoid being fooled by the trustworthy appearance of
this person in the future. Being able to remember appearance-
incongruent behaviors even under conditions of cognitive load
may be beneficial in that it allows people to sustain successful
reciprocal cooperation even under the distracting and stressful
conditions that are characteristic of everyday life.
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